State v. Berber Respondent\u27s Brief Dckt. 40421 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
12-6-2013
State v. Berber Respondent's Brief Dckt. 40421
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please
contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"State v. Berber Respondent's Brief Dckt. 40421" (2013). Not Reported. 1144.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/1144
IN THE SUPREME COURT THE STATE OF IDA~---........ 





Canyon Co. Case No. 
CR-2011-167 48 
) 
JUAN RAMON BERBER, aka JOHN ) 




BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF CANYON 
HONORABLE JUNEAL C. KERRICK 
District Judge 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
State of Idaho 
PAUL R. PANTHER 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Criminal Law Division 
JESSICA M. LORELLO 
Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
P.O. Box 83720 




SPENCER J. HAHN 
Deputy State Appellate 
Public Defender 
3647 Lake Harbor Lane 
Boise, Idaho 83703 
(208) 334-2712 
' LJt.C ... :) 2013 
CO\lrL..':"'."'Court of il;)peals....-
Entercd on Al S by __ 
ATTORNEY FOR 
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PAGE 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .............................. . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ........................................................................ 1 
Nature Of The Case ............................................................................. 1 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings ................................ 1 
ISSUE ............................................................................................................. 3 
ARGUMENT ................................................................................................... 4 
Berber Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's 
1.R.E. 404(b) Ruling ............................................................................. 4 
A. Introduction ............................................................................... 4 
B. Standard Of Review ................................................................. 4 
C. Berber Has Failed To Show Error In The District 
Court's I.R.E. 404(b) Ruling ....................................................... 5 
1. The Uncharged Acts Admitted At Trial Were 
Relevant. ......................................................................... 5 
2. The Probative Value Of The Challenged Evidence 
Was Not Substantially Outweighed By The Danger 
Of Unfair Prejudice ......................................................... 8 
D. Even If Berber Has Met His Burden Of Showing 
Evidentiary Error, Any Such Error Is Harmless ........................ 11 
CONCLUSION .............................................................................................. 12 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ........................................................................ 12 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES PAGE 
Chaoman v. California, U.S. 18 (1967) ........................................ 11 
Neder v. United States, 527 U S. 1 (1999) .................................................. 11 
State v. Cross, 132 Idaho 667,978 P.2d 227 (1999) ...................................... 5 
State v. Floyd, 125 Idaho 651, 873 P.2d 905 (Ct App. 1994) ..................... 8, 9 
State v. Gauna, 117 Idaho 83, 785 P.2d 647 (Ct. App. 1989) ......... . ................. 5 
State v. Gomez, 151 Idaho 146, 254 P.3d 47 (Ct. App. 2011 ) .......................... 6 
State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49,205 P.3d 1185 (2009) .................................... , 6 
State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho 664,227 P.3d 918 (2010) ............................... 11 
State v. Leavitt, 116 Idaho 285,775 P.2d 599 (1989) ..................................... 9 
State v. Martin, 118 Idaho 334, 796 P.2d 1007 (1990) .................................. 9 
State v. Moore, 120 Idaho 743, 819 P.2d 1143 (1991) ....................................... 6 
State v. Nichols, 124 Idaho 651, 862 P.2d 343 (Ct. App. 1993) .......................... 8 
State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 245 P.3d 961 (2010) ......................................... 11 
State v. Phillips, 123 Idaho 178, 845 P.2d 1211 (1993) ........................................ 5 
State v. Ruiz, 150 Idaho 469, 248 P.3d 720 (2010) ............................................ 8 
State v. Scovell, 136 Idaho 587, 38 P.3d 625 (Ct. App. 2001 ) .......................... 6, 7 
State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 77 P.3d 956 (2003) ........................................ 6 
State v. Tolman, 121 Idaho 899, 828 P.2d 1304 (1992) ................................... 6, 7 




I. '" ,5, , 10 
iii 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
from the entered ju 
verdict finding him guilty of lewd conduct. Berber contends the district court 
erred in allowing the admission of I.RE. 404(b) evidence. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
Berber had sexual intercourse with his girlfriend's 1 daughter, N M., on 
several occasions. (See generally Tr., pp.316-343.) The abuse occurred while 
N.M. was 12- and 13-years old and started around New Year's Eve in 2008 when 
NM. lived in Caldwell, Idaho, with her mom, Berber, and her siblings. (Tr., 
p.316, L.13 p.326, L.18.) The abuse continued when the family moved from 
Caldwell to California and ended when N.M.'s dad went to California in 
November 2009 to pick N.M. up and move her back to Idaho. (Tr., p.338, L.12 -
p.347, L.5, p.464, Ls.20-24.) N.M. had not yet disclosed the abuse at that time; 
she eventually disclosed in July 2010 when she confided in her stepsister, K. 
(Tr., p.304, L.4, p.350, Ls.2-15, p.520, Ls.22-24.) The disclosure came after a 
custody battle between N.M.'s parents in which N.M.'s father was awarded 
custody. (Tr., p.465, Ls.5-9, p.519, L.24 -p.521, L.2.) The abuse allegations, 
however, were not a component of the court's custody determination. (Tr., 
p.392, Ls.13-21, p.465, Ls.10-14.) 
1 At the time of the abuse, Berber was N.M.'s mother's boyfriend; they later 
married on "11-11-11." (Tr., p.555, Ls.1-2.) 
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After N.M. disclosed to her stepsister. the information was communicated 
to her father and to her mother who contacted !aw enforcement. (Tr., p.355, 
L.14 - p.356, L.7.) During the subsequent investigation, N.M. was interviewed at 
CARES. (Tr., p.263, Ls.2-6.) The examination conducted as part of that 
interview revealed N.M. had a "deep notch" in her hymen, which is indicative of 
"bl t " A ~t •; t " (T 2~7 L 19 268 L 2) At' th t' f un ,orce p~nc.ra11ng .rauma. . r., p. b , . . - p. , . . e 1me o 
the CARES interview, N.M. also disclosed that, subsequent to the abuse 
perpetrated by Berber, she was abused by another individual, Octavio Garcia, 
after she returned to Idaho with her father in 2009. (Tr., p.272, Ls.2-3, p.350, 
L.19 - p.352, L.31.) Garcia was charged with and pied guilty to lewd conduct for 
that offense. (Tr., p.396, Ls.19-24; Exhibit 3.) 
A grand jury indicted Berber on one count of lewd conduct. (R., pp.8-9.) 
The Indictment specifically charged Berber with "having manual to genital and/or 
genital to genital" content with N. M. "on or between March 26, 2009 and 
November 30, 2009" in Canyon County. (R., pp.8-9.) At trial, however, N.M. 
was permitted to testify about additional acts of abuse dating back to the initial 
offense and including acts of oral to genital and anal to genital contact (See 
generally, Tr., pp.316-343.) 
The jury found Berber guilty as charged. (R., p.188.) The court imposed 
a unified 20-year sentence with six and one-half years fixed. (R., pp.210-211.) 
Berber filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.212-213.) 
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ISSUE 
states on appeal as: 
Did the district court err when it permitted the presentation of 
irrelevant propensity evidence in violation of Rule 404(b), and 
abuse its discretion when it admitted the other bad acts evidence 
without conducting the requisite balancing test? 
(Appellant's Brief, p.4.) 
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as: 
Has Berber failed to show error in the district court's I.R. 404(b) ruling? 
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ARGUMENT 
Berber Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's LRE. 404(b) Ruling 
A. Introduction 
Berber challenges the district court's ruling allowing N.M. to testify about 
uncharged acts of lewd conduct. Specifically, Berber contends "the district court 
erred when, over his objection, it concluded that other bad acts evidence was not 
propensity evidence and was relevant under Rule 404(b )" and "when it admitted 
the evidence after refusing to conduct the requisite balancing test." (Appellant's 
Brief, pp.5-6.) Berber's arguments fail. The district court correctly concluded the 
evidence was admissible and, contrary to Berber's claim on appeal, the district 
court conducted the required balancing test under I.RE. 403. Berber has, 
therefore, failed to show error in the district court's I.RE. 404(b) ruling. Even if 
Berber had met his burden of showing error, any error is harmless. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Rulings under I.R.E. 404(b) are reviewed under a bifurcated standard: 
whether the evidence is admissible for a purpose other than propensity is given 
free review while the determination of whether the probative value of the 
evidence is substantially outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice is 
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 51, 205 P.3d 
1185, 1187 (2009). 
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C. Berber Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's I.R.E. 404(b) 
Ruling 
1. The Uncharged Acts Admitted At Trial Were Relevant 
to trial, the state gave notice of its intent to introduce evidence, 
pursuant to I.R. 404(b). (R, pp.60-61.) The notice indicated the state 
intended to introduce evidence that Berber "had on-going sexual contact with 
N.M. during the time period from on or around December 31, 2008 to November 
30, 2009; and these on-going sexual acts happened both in Idaho and 
California." (R., p.61.) The notice also described the sexual contact as including 
"genital to genital contact, oral to genital contact, and genital to anal contact." 
(R., p.61.) The court allowed the presentation of such evidence. 
"Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove a 
defendant's criminal propensity. However, such evidence may be admissible for 
a purpose other than that prohibited by I.R.E. 404(b)." State v. Truman, 150 
Idaho 714, 249 P.3d 1169 (Ct. App. 2011) (citations omitted). Other proper 
purposes include proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. 1.R.E. 404(b); State v. 
Phillips, 123 Idaho 178, 845 P.2d 1211 (1993); State v. Gauna, 117 Idaho 83, 
87, 785 P.2d 647, 651 (Ct. App. 1989). As long as the evidence is relevant to 
prove some issue other than the defendant's character and its probative value 
for the proper purpose is not substantially outweighed by the probability of unfair 
prejudice, it is not error to admit it. State v. Cross, 132 Idaho 667, 670, 978 P.2d 
227, 230 (1999). The second prong of this test only excludes evidence if the 
5 
danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs its probative value. State v. 
Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 275-76, 77 P.3d 956, 964-65 (2003). 
On appeal, Berber argues that the district court erred by admitting the 
proffered I.R.E. 404(b) evidence because, he claims, "none of the exceptions in 
Rule 404(b) apply to render the other bad act evidence relevant and admissible." 
(Appellant's Brief, p. 7.) Berber is incorrect. 
Berber's prolonged and repeated abuse of N.M. was relevant for several 
reasons. First, pursuant to LR.E. 404(b), evidence of prior wrongs or acts may 
be admitted when relevant to show the defendant's intent and/or plan to commit 
the charged offense. LR.E. 404(b); State v. Gomez, 151 Idaho 146, 254 P.3d 
47, 53 (Ct. App. 2011). In sex abuse cases, evidence that the defendant has 
engaged in other uncharged acts of sexual misconduct with the victim is 
"relevant to demonstrate the young victim's credibility." State v. Scovell, 136 
Idaho 587, 590, 38 P.3d 625, 628 (Ct. App. 2001) (citing State v. Tolman, 121 
Idaho 899, 904, 828 P.2d 1304, 1309 (1992), and State v. Moore, 120 Idaho 
743, 745-46, 819 P.2d 1143, 1145-46 (1991). 2 Such evidence "may render the 
jury 'better able to compare patterns and methods, details and generalities, 
consistencies and discrepancies, and thereby [make] a more meaningful and 
2 The state recognizes that Scovell, which relied, in part, on Moore, predates 
Grist and the Idaho Supreme Court's limitation on Moore. However, the Idaho 
Supreme Court did "not overrule Moore in its entirety." Grist, 147 Idaho at 54, 
205 P.3d at 1190. Importantly, the Court reaffirmed that "Moore correctly states: 
'Where relevant to the credibility of the parties, evidence of a common criminal 
design is admissible."' kl Consistent with this recognition, since Grist, the Idaho 
Court of Appeals has cited Scovell with approval. Gomez, 151 Idaho at 153 n.3, 
254 P.3d at 54 n.3. 
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accurate assessment of the parties credibility."' Scovell, 136 Idaho at 590, 38 
P.3d at 628 (quoting Tolman, 121 Idaho at 905, 828 P.2d at 1310 (alteration 
original). In is case, N.M.'s "testimony about when and how the abusive 
behavior began allowed the jury to see the full picture, putting her testimony 
about the charged acts into context." Scovell, 136 Idaho at 590, 38 P.3d at 628. 
"The challenged testimony gave the jury a better ability to assess whether [N.M.] 
was fabricating her story or telling the truth." kL. "Therefore, ... the evidence 
was relevant to [N.M.'s] credibility." kL. 
Second, and not withstanding Berber's claim to the contrary, identity was 
an issue in this case. (Appellant's Brief, p.7.) There was evidence presented 
that N.M. was abused by a second man who pied guilty to the offense. Berber 
argued the hymen injury noted by the CARES nurse could have been caused by 
Garcia rather than Berber. (Tr., p.611, L.22 - p.612, L.13 ) However, N.M. 
testified that Berber's long-term abuse preceded the offense committed by 
Garcia (Tr., p.352, Ls.4-18), and the charge to which Garcia pied alleged the 
offense was committed in June 2010 (Exhibit 3). 
Berber also placed identity at issue by presenting evidence that he had a 
tattoo on his penis, which N.M. did not notice - a point that is hardly surprising 
given the nature of the tattoo, which appears faded and indecipherable as 
anything in particular and could be misjudged as some sort of natural circulatory 
discoloration, especially by a young child. Moreover, Berber's reliance on his 
tattoo to establish he was not the one who abused N.M. presupposes she 
actually looked at his penis. Unsurprisingly, N.M. testified that she did not pay 
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particular attention to Berber's penis and, in fact, closed her eyes when Berber 
put his penis in her mouth. (Tr., p.394, Ls.14-23.) N.M.'s ability to explain the 
scope of her abuse by Berber was relevant to rebut Berber's claim that he was 
not the one who abused N.M. 
Third, the 404(b) evidence was relevant to show opportunity, which was 
another key aspect of Berber's defense. Berber called N.M.'s mom as a witness 
and she testified that Berber had no opportunity to abuse N.M. because, she 
claimed, they were "together all the time" and "[t]here was not one time that it 
could happen." (Tr., p.517, Ls.8-9.) Berber also called N.M.'s grandmother, 
Patricia, as a witness. With respect to the first incident of abuse on New Year's 
Eve about which N.M. testified, Patricia claimed N.M. was at her house. (Tr., 
p.494, L.21 - p.496, L.19.) N.M.'s mom corroborated this testimony. (Tr., p.509, 
L.24 - p.512, L.8.) Evidence that the abuse occurred on multiple occasions and 
the circumstances under which it occurred was relevant to show opportunity. 
Berber has failed to show the uncharged sexual acts he perpetrated on 
N.M. were not relevant. 
2. The Probative Value Of The Challenged Evidence Was Not 
Substantially Outweighed By The Danger Of Unfair Prejudice 
Pursuant to I.R.E. 403, relevant evidence may be excluded if, in the 
district court's discretion, the danger of unfair prejudice -- which is the tendency 
to suggest a decision on an improper basis -- substantially outweighs the 
probative value of the evidence. State v. Ruiz, 150 Idaho 469, 4 71, 248 P.3d 
720, 722 (2010); State v. Floyd, 125 Idaho 651, 654, 873 P.2d 905, 907 (Ct. 
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App. 1994); State v. Nichols, 124 Idaho 651, 656, 862 P.2d 343, 348 (Ct. App. 
1993). As previously explained by the Idaho Supreme Court: 
Under the rule, the evidence is only excluded if the probative value 
is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. The 
rule suggests a strong preference for admissibility of relevant 
evidence. 
State v. Martin, 118 Idaho 334, 340 n.3, 796 P.2d 1007, 1013 n.3 (1990) 
(emphasis in original). 
Rule 403 does not offer protection against evidence that is merely 
prejudicial in the sense of being detrimental to a party's case. See State v. 
Leavitt, 116 Idaho 285, 290, 775 P.2d 599, 604 (1989) ("Certainly that evidence 
was prejudicial to the defendant, however, almost all evidence in a criminal trial 
is demonstrably admitted to prove the case of the state, and thus results in 
prejudice to a defendant."). Rather, the rule protects only against evidence that 
is unfairly prejudicial, that is, evidence that tends to suggest a decision on an 
improper basis. Floyd, 125 Idaho at 654, 873 P.2d at 908. 
Berber claims "the district court abused its discretion when it affirmatively 
refused to conduct the requisite balancing test under Rule 403." (Appellant's 
Brief, p.12.) In support of this argument, Berber relies on the following 
statements by the district court: 
And the third prong that I've - that I'm going to make 
reference to, although I've impliedly done so, is where the probative 
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. 
And that is not a factor here, because it's -- it's the same 
individuals. And I think the testimony is going to be something that 
either is given -- I mean, either the jury will either find that credible 
or they won't find it credible. 
(Appellant's Brief, p.12 (quoting Tr., p.226, Ls.5-13) (emphasis by Berber).) 
Berber interprets the italicized language as the district court creating a 
Rule 403 "exception for conduct involving the same parties." (Appellant's Brief, 
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p.12.) Berber's interpretation of the court's comments, particularly when read in 
context, is unwarranted. Most notably, the court prefaced its comments with the 
recitation of the applicable legal standard. (Tr., p.226, Ls.5-8.) The court did not 
impose its own exception to that standard by stating "that is not a factor here."3 
(Tr., p.226, Ls.8-9.) The court's reference to it not being "a factor" is the 
equivalent of stating the probative value of the evidence was not substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. The court's rationale for that 
conclusion appears to be based on the fact that, unlike 404(b) issues that involve 
sexual abuse of other victims, which arguably have a greater potential for 
prejudice, in this case the uncharged acts involved the same victim. Because 
the question for the jury would be one of credibility, the probative value of the 
evidence was high (for the reasons discussed above in relation to why the 
evidence was relevant) as compared to the minimal prejudicial value associated 
with evidence of multiple acts of abuse. The fact that Berber abused N.M. at all 
was prejudicial. Any additional prejudice related to his act of doing it more than 
once did not substantially outweigh the probative value. 
Berber has failed to establish that the district court either failed to conduct 
the weighing required by LR. E. 403 or abused its discretion by admitting the 
uncharged acts of abuse. 
3 It is also worth noting that Berber did not object to the district court's application 
of the legal standard; to the extent he believed the court was creating an 
exception to I.R.E. 403, he should have raised the issue below rather than 
attempt to interpret the language employed, for the first time on appeal, in a 
manner he deems favorable to his claim. 
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D. Even If Berber Has Met His Burden Of Showing Evidentiary Error. Any 
Such Error Is Harmless 
Idaho Criminal Rule 52 provides that "[a]ny error, defect, irregularity or 
variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded." I.C.R. 
52. 'The inquiry is whether, beyond a reasonable doubt, a rational jury would 
have convicted [the defendant] even without the admission of the challenged 
evidence." State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho 664, 669, 227 P.3d 918, 923 (2010) 
(citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967); Neder v. United States, 
527 U.S. 1 18 (1999)); see also State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227, 245 P.3d 
961, 979 (2010). 
Even if the district court erred in permitting the introduction of the state's 
proffered I.RE 404(b), such error is harmless. It is unlikely the jury would have 
found N.M.'s testimony any less compelling had it been limited to the two single 
acts of abuse alleged in the Indictment - genital to genital or manual to genital. 
Further, N.M.'s testimony was corroborated by the CARES nurse, Alisa Ortega. 
Ortega not only testified about N.M.'s hymen injury but also testified, without 
objection, that, based on the information N.M. provided "as well as her physical 
examination, it was [her] conclusion that [N.M.] had been sexually abused." (Tr., 
p.271, Ls.16-22.) The jury apparently found Ortega's testimony significant as 
evidenced by a note it sent during deliberations, which reads: "We would like to 
hear part of Alisa Ortega's testimony. We wish to focus on her meeting with 
N.M." (R., p.187.) 
In addition, the court gave both a limiting instruction in relation to the 
404(b) evidence (R., p.172) and a unanimity instruction such that the jury was 
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required the jury to "unanimously agree which act or incident satisfies a!I the 
elements of the crime charged" (R., p.171). 
Given the evidence presented, along with the iim1ting instructions, this 
Court can conclude any error in admission of the I.RE. 404(b) evidence was 
harmless. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment entered 
upon the jury verdict finding Berber guilty of lewd conduct. 
DATED this 6th day of December 2013. 
JESSIGA M. LORELLO 
Deputy'Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
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SPENCERJ.HAHN 
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
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